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Alphabet Size Reduction for Secure Network
Coding: A Graph Theoretic Approach
Xuan Guang, Member, IEEE, and Raymond W. Yeung, Fellow, IEEE
Abstract
We consider a communication network where there exist wiretappers who can access a subset of
channels, called a wiretap set, which is chosen from a given collection of wiretap sets. The collection
of wiretap sets can be arbitrary. Secure network coding is applied to prevent the source information
from being leaked to the wiretappers. In secure network coding, the required alphabet size is an open
problem not only of theoretical interest but also of practical importance, because it is closely related to the
implementation of such coding schemes in terms of computational complexity and storage requirement.
In this paper, we develop a systematic graph-theoretic approach for improving Cai and Yeung’s lower
bound on the required alphabet size for the existence of secure network codes. The new lower bound
thus obtained, which depends only on the network topology and the collection of wiretap sets, can be
significantly smaller than Cai and Yeung’s lower bound. A polynomial-time algorithm is devised for
efficient computation of the new lower bound.
Index Terms
Information-theoretic security, secure network coding, wiretap network, alphabet size, lower bound,
polynomial-time algorithm, graph theory.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Shannon’s celebrated paper [1], the well-known Shannon cipher system is proposed, in which a
sender wishes to transmit a private message to a receiver in the presence of a wiretapper, and it is
required that the wiretapper can obtain no information about the message. For this purpose, the sender
encrypts the message with a random key which is shared with the receiver via a “secure” channel and
is inaccessible by the wiretapper. The encrypted message is transmitted to the receiver via a “public”
channel which is eavesdropped by the wiretapper. The receiver can recover the message from the random
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key and the encrypted message, while the wiretapper obtains no information about the message. In the
literature, this is referred to as information-theoretic security.
Another well-known cipher system of information-theoretic security is secret sharing, proposed inde-
pendently by Blakley [2] and Shamir [3], which is more elaborate than Shannon cipher system. In this
system, a secret is encoded into shares which are distributed among a set of participants in such a way
that only an arbitrarily specified qualified set of participants can recover the secret, while no information
at all about the secret can be obtained from the shares of an unqualified set of participants.
In the context of communications, Ozarow and Wyner [4] proposed a related model called wiretap
channel II. In this model, the sender’s message is transmitted to the receiver through a set of noiseless
point-to-point channels. It is assumed that a wiretapper can fully access any one but not more than one
subset of the channels up to a certain size, which is referred to as a wiretap set. Logically, secret sharing
contains wiretap channel II as a special case.
In 1978, Celebiler and Stette [5] proposed a scheme that can improve the efficiency of a two-way
satellite communication system by performing the addition of two bits onboard the satellite. In 1999,
Yeung and Zhang [6] studied the general coding problem in a satellite communication system and obtained
an inner bound and an outer bound on the capacity region. In 2000, Ahlswede et al. [7] proposed the
general concept of network coding that allows the intermediate nodes in a noiseless network to process
the received information. In particular, they proved that if coding is applied at the nodes in a network,
rather than routing only, the source node can multicast messages to all the sink nodes at the theoretically
maximum rate, i.e., the smallest minimum cut capacity between the source node and a sink node, as the
alphabet size of both the information source and the channel transmission symbol tends to infinity. Li et al.
[8] further proved that linear network coding with a finite alphabet is sufficient for optimal multicast
by means of a vector space approach. Independently, Koetter and Me´dard [9] developed an algebraic
characterization of linear network coding by means of a matrix approach. The above two approaches
correspond to the global and local descriptions of linear network coding, respectively. Jaggi et al. [10]
proposed a deterministic polynomial-time algorithm for constructing a linear network code. In Tan et al.
[11], the fundamental concept of linear independence among global encoding kernels was studied in
depth. Based on this, a unified construction for different classes of linear network codes is obtained. It was
shown explicitly in Sun et al. [12] that the linear independence structure of a generic linear network code
naturally induces a matroid. An interesting characterization of the required field size of linear network
codes over acyclic multicast networks was recently obtained by Sun et al. [13]. Their work reveals that
the existence of a linear network code over a given finite field does not imply the existence of one over
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all larger finite fields. For comprehensive discussions of network coding, we refer the reader to [14]–[18].
In the paradigm of network coding, information-theoretic security is naturally considered in the presence
of a wiretapper. This problem, called secure network coding, was introduced by Cai and Yeung in [19],
[20]. In the wiretap network model of secure network coding, the wiretapper, who can access any one
wiretap set of edges, is not allowed to obtain any information about the private source message, while
all the sink nodes as legal users can decode the private source message with zero error. Secret sharing
can be formulated as a special case of secure network coding.
Similar to the coding for the classical wiretap models [1]–[4], in secure network coding, it is necessary
to randomize the source message to guarantee information-theoretic security. El Rouayheb et al. [21]
showed that the construction of secure network codes in [19], [20] can be viewed as a network gener-
alization of the code construction for wiretap channel II in [4]. Motivated by El Rouayheb et al., Silva
and Kschischang [22] proposed a universal design of secure network codes via rank-metric codes such
that the design of linear network codes for message transmission and the design of coding for security
can be separated.
For secure network coding, the existing bound on the required alphabet size in [20]–[22] is roughly
equal to the number of all wiretap sets, which is typically too large for implementation in terms of
computational complexity and storage requirement. Therefore, the required alphabet size is a problem
not only of theoretical interest but also of practical importance. Feldman et al. [23] showed that for a
given security level, the alphabet size can be reduced by sacrificing a small fraction of the information
rate. However, if the information rate is not sacrificed, even for the special case of an r-wiretap network,
i.e., the wiretapper can access any one subset of at most r edges, whether it is possible to reduce the
required alphabet size is not known [21]. Recently, for this special case, Guang et al. [24] proposed
an equivalence relation of wiretap sets that can be applied to obtain an improved lower bound on the
required field size. However, they did not provide any efficient algorithm for computing this bound.
In this paper, we fully explore the underlying mathematical structure of the approach in [24] and
show that the required alphabet size for the existence of secure network codes can be reduced signifi-
cantly, where the collection of the wiretap sets considered here is arbitrary. The main contributions and
organization of the paper are given as follows:
• In Section II, we present secure network coding and the preliminaries, and introduce the necessary
notation and definitions.
• In Section III, we generalize the equivalence relation amongst the wiretap sets in r-wiretap networks
in [24] to general wiretap networks and introduce a domination relation amongst the equivalence
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classes. We further prove that this domination relation is a strict partial order so that the set of the
equivalence classes constitutes a strictly partially ordered set. The number of the maximal elements
in this strictly partially ordered set is proved to be a lower bound on the required alphabet size, which
in general is a significant improvement over the existing results. Our lower bound is applicable to
both linear and non-linear secure network codes, and its improvement over the existing results can
be unbounded.
• Our lower bound is graph-theoretical, and it depends only on the network topology and the collection
of the wiretap sets. Section IV is devoted to the development of an efficient computation of our
lower bound. Toward this end, we introduce the concept of primary minimum cut, by which we can
bypass the complicated operations for determining the equivalence classes of wiretap sets and the
domination relation among them. With this, a polynomial-time algorithm is developed for computing
the lower bound.
• We conclude in Section V with a summary of our results and a remark on future research.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we first present the model of a wiretap network [19], [20] to be discussed in this
paper. Let G = (V,E) be a finite directed acyclic network with a single source node s and a set of
sink nodes T ⊂ V \ {s}, where V and E are the sets of nodes and edges, respectively. In G, let
e = (u, v) ∈ E stand for a directed edge from node u to node v, where node u is called the tail of e
and node v is called the head of e, denoted by tail(e) and head(e), respectively. Further, for a node v,
define In(v) as the set of incoming edges of v and Out(v) as the set of outgoing edges of v. Formally,
In(v) = {e ∈ E : head(e) = v} and Out(v) = {e ∈ E : tail(e) = v}. Without loss of generality,
assume In(s) = ∅ and Out(t) = ∅ for any sink node t ∈ T . An index taken from an alphabet can be
transmitted on each edge e in E and parallel edges between two adjacent nodes are allowed. In other
words, the capacity of each edge is taken to be 1. We make this assumption throughput the paper. Let
A be a collection of subsets of E, where every edge set in A is called a wiretap set. Then a wiretap
network is specified by a quadruple (G, s, T,A ), where the source node s generates a source message
and injects it into the network; each sink node t ∈ T as a legal user is required to recover the source
message with zero error; arbitrary one wiretap set in A , but no more than one, may be fully accessed
by a wiretapper. The collection A of the wiretap sets is known by the source node and sink nodes but
which wiretap set in A is actually eavesdropped is unknown. Since the source node s and the sink node
set T are usually fixed, we use (G,A ) to denote such a wiretap network for simplicity.
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In a network G, if a sequence of edges (e1, e2, · · · , em) satisfies tail(e1) = u, head(em) = v, and
tail(ek+1) = head(ek) for all k = 1, 2, · · · ,m− 1, we say that the sequence (e1, e2, · · · , em) is a path
from node u (or edge e1) to node v (or edge em). A cut between the source node s and a non-source
node t is defined as a set of edges whose removal disconnects s from t. The capacity of a cut between
s and t is defined as the number of edges in the cut, and the minimum of the capacities of all the cuts
between s and t is called the minimum cut capacity between them. A cut between s and t is called a
minimum cut if its capacity achieves the minimum cut capacity between them. These concepts can be
extended to edge subsets of E. We first consider a cut between s and a set of non-source nodes T in the
network G as follows. We create a new node tT , and for every node t in T , add a new “super-edge” of
infinite capacity 1 from t to tT (which is equivalent to adding infinite parallel edges from t to tT ). A cut
of the finite capacity between s and tT is defined as a cut between s and T . We can naturally extend
the capacity of a cut, the minimum cut capacity and the minimum cut to the case of T . Furthermore, let
A ⊂ E be an edge subset. Introduce a node te for each edge e ∈ A which splits e into two edges e1 and
e2 with tail(e1) = tail(e), head(e2) = head(e), and head(e1) = tail(e2) = te. Let TA = {te : e ∈ A}
and then a cut between s and TA is defined as a cut between s and A. In particular, if e1 or e2 appears in
the cut, replace it by e. Similarly, the minimum cut capacity between s and A, denoted by mincut(s,A),
is defined as the minimum cut capacity between s and TA, and a cut between s and A achieving the
minimum cut capacity mincut(s,A) is called a minimum cut. If an edge set B ⊆ E is a cut between the
source node s and a non-source node t (resp. a set of non-source nodes T and a set of edges A), then
we say that the edge set B separates t (resp. T and A) from s. Note that if B separates t (resp. T and
A) from s, then every path from s to t (resp. T and A) passes through at least one edge in B.
The following Menger’s theorem shows that the minimum cut capacity between node s to node t
(resp. T and A) and the maximum number of edge-disjoint paths from s to t (resp. T and A) are really
alternative ways to address the same issue.
Edge Version of Menger’s Theorem ( [27, Theorem 6.7] and [28, Theorem 7.16]): The maximum
number of edge-disjoint paths from node s to node t equals the minimum cut capacity between node s
and node t.
In secure network coding, the source node s generates a random source message M according to an
arbitrary distribution on a message set M. The source message M is multicast to every sink node t ∈ T ,
while being protected from the wiretapper who can access any wiretap set A in A . Similar to the other
1Infinite symbols in the alphabet can be transmitted by one use of the edge.
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information-theoretically secure models, in our wiretap network model, it is necessary to randomize the
source message to combat the wiretapper. The randomness available at the source node, called the key,
is a random variable K that takes values in a set of keys K according to the uniform distribution.
Let F be an alphabet. An F-valued secure network code on a wiretap network (G,A ) consists of a
set of local encoding mappings {φe : e ∈ E} such that for every e, φe is a mapping from M×K to the
alphabet F if e ∈ Out(s), and is a mapping from F |In(v)| to F if e ∈ Out(v) for a node v ∈ V \ {s}.
The information rate of the secure network code is log|F| |M|.
To facilitate our discussion, let Ye be the random variable transmitted on the edge e that is a function of
the random source message M and the random key K. For a subset A of E, denote (Ye : e ∈ A) by YA.
Definition 1: For a secure network code on the wiretap network (G,A ), I(YA;M) = 0 for every
wiretap set A ∈ A , where I(YA;M) denotes the mutual information between YA and M .
The notion of security used in the definition of a secure network code is referred in the literature as
information-theoretic security as oppose to computational security.
Proposition 1 ( [20, Theorem 3]): Let (G,A ) be a wiretap network and F be an alphabet with
|F| ≥ |T |, the number of sink nodes in G. Then there exists an F-valued secure network code over
(G,A ) provided that |F| > |A |. 2
If a wiretap set A ∈ A satisfies |A| = mincut(s,A), then we say that the wiretap set A is regular.
Further, if all wiretap sets A in A are regular, then we say that the collection of wiretap sets A is
regular. For an arbitrary A , by Proposition 1, there exists a secure network code if |F| > |A |. Now
for each A in A , replace it by a minimum cut CUTA between s and A to form A ′. Observe that the
minimum cut CUTA is regular since
|CUTA| = mincut(s,A) ≤ mincut(s,CUTA) ≤ |CUTA|,
where the first inequality follows from the fact that each cut separating CUTA from s also separates A
from s, and a secure network code which is secure for the wiretap sets in A ′ is also secure for the wiretap
sets in A . Therefore, with respect to the bound given by Proposition 1, it suffices to consider regular
wiretap sets. In the rest of the paper, we assume that all edge sets are regular unless otherwise specified.
In the following, we recall two concepts about strict and non-strict partial orders, which are used
frequently in the paper.
2The reason for requiring |F| ≥ |T | here is to guarantee the existence of a network code on G. In general, |A | is much
larger than |T |.
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Definition 2: Let D be a finite set, and let “<” and “≤” be two binary relations amongst the elements
in D.
• The binary relation “<” is called a strict partial order in D if the following conditions are satisfied
for arbitrary elements a, b, and c in D:
1) (Irreflexivity) a ≮ a;
2) (Transitivity) if a < b and b < c, then a < c;
3) (Asymmetry) if a < b, then b ≮ a.3
• The binary relation “≤” is called a non-strict partial order in D if the following conditions are
satisfied for arbitrary elements a, b, and c in D:
1) (Reflexivity) a ≤ a;
2) (Antisymmetry) if a ≤ b and b ≤ a, then a = b;
3) (Transitivity) if a ≤ b and b ≤ c, then a ≤ c.
III. REQUIRED ALPHABET SIZE FOR SECURE NETWORK CODING
In this section, for a wiretap network (G,A ), we prove a new bound on the required alphabet size of
the existence of secure network codes that improves upon the lower bound in [24]. In the next section,
we present an efficient algorithm for evaluating this bound.
Let A and A′ be two edge sets in G. Define a binary relation “∼” between A and A′: A ∼ A′ if and
only if there exists an edge set CUT which is a minimum cut between s and A and also between s and
A′, that is, A and A′ have a common minimum cut between the source node s and each of them. Note
that A ∼ A′ implies |A| = |A′| because mincut(s,A) = |CUT| = mincut(s,A′) and both A and A′
are regular. It was proved in [24] that “∼” is an equivalence relation. While reflexivity and symmetry of
“∼” are immediate, the proof of transitivity is nontrivial.
With the relation “∼”, the wiretap sets in A can be partitioned into equivalence classes. All the wiretap
sets in an equivalence class have a common minimum cut, which is implied by the transitivity of “∼”. To
see this, consider wiretap sets A, A′, and A′′ that are in the same equivalence class. Let A and A′ have a
common minimum cut CUT, and let A′ and A′′ have a common minimum cut CUT′. Then CUT ∼ A′
and CUT′ ∼ A′. By the transitivity of “∼”, we have CUT ∼ CUT′, implying that there exists a common
minimum cut between s and CUT and between s and CUT′, which in turn is a minimum cut between
s and A, between s and A′, and between s and A′′. Then we see by induction that all the wiretap sets
3Asymmetry can readily be deduced from irreflexivity and transitivity.
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in the equivalence class can have a common minimum cut from s. Immediately, we give the following
proposition.
Proposition 2: Let A1, A2, · · · , Am be m equivalent edge sets under the equivalence relation “∼”. Then
mincut(s,∪mi=1Ai) = mincut(s,Aj), ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m. (1)
Proof: Since the edge sets A1, A2, · · · , Am are equivalent, they have a common minimum cut CUT
separating each of them from s. This implies that
1) |CUT| = mincut(s,Aj), ∀j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m;
2) CUT is a cut between s and ∪mi=1Ai.
Combining 1) and 2), we have that for all j, 1 ≤ j ≤ m,
|CUT| = mincut(s,Aj) ≤ mincut(s,∪
m
i=1Ai) ≤ |CUT|,
completing the proof.
Let N(A ) be the number of the equivalence classes in A . According to Proposition 1 and the
discussions that follow, by replacing each equivalence class of wiretap sets in A by its common minimum
cut, we see that there exists an F-valued secure network code on (G,A ) provided that |F| > N(A ).
This lower bound N(A ) on |F| was originally obtained in [24] for r-wiretap networks, but it also applies
for general wiretap networks. We use the following example to illustrate the advantage of this approach.
s
i2 i4i3
i1 i5
i6
i7
i8
i9
t1 t2
e1
e2
e3
e4 e5
e6
e7
e8 e9
e10 e11
e12 e13 e14
e15
e16 e17
e18
e19e20
e21
Fig. 1. The network G.
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Example 1: Consider the network G depicted in Fig. 1. Let the collection of wiretap sets A be
A =
{
{e6}, {e7}, {e8}, {e9}, {e12}, {e13}, {e14}, {e15}, {e18}, {e19}, {e20}, {e21},
{e6, e18}, {e6, e19}, {e7, e18}, {e7, e19}, {e8, e11}, {e8, e16}, {e8, e18}, {e9, e10},
{e9, e18}, {e9, e19}, {e10, e14}, {e10, e15}, {e10, e19}, {e10, e21}, {e11, e14}, {e11, e15},
{e11, e18}, {e11, e20}, {e12, e20}, {e12, e21}, {e13, e17}, {e13, e21}, {e14, e20}, {e14, e21},
{e15, e20}, {e15, e21}, {e18, e20}, {e18, e21}, {e19, e20}, {e19, e21},
{e1, e3, e16}, {e1, e11, e16}, {e2, e10, e16}, {e3, e5, e17}, {e4, e10, e17}, {e5, e11, e17}
}
,
with |A | = 48. The equivalence classes of wiretap sets are
Cl1 =
{
{e6}, {e7}
}
, Cl2 =
{
{e8}, {e9}
}
, Cl3 =
{
{e12}, {e13}
}
,
Cl4 =
{
{e14}, {e15}
}
, Cl5 =
{
{e18}, {e19}
}
, Cl6 =
{
{e20}, {e21}
}
,
Cl7 =
{
{e8, e11}, {e9, e10}
}
, Cl8 =
{
{e10, e19}, {e11, e18}
}
, Cl9 =
{
{e10, e21}, {e11, e20}
}
,
Cl10 =
{
{e10, e14}, {e10, e15}, {e11, e14}, {e11, e15}
}
,
Cl11 =
{
{e18, e20}, {e18, e21}, {e19, e20}, {e19, e21}
}
,
Cl12 =
{
{e6, e18}, {e6, e19}, {e7, e18}, {e7, e19}, {e8, e16}, {e8, e18}, {e9, e18}, {e9, e19}
}
,
Cl13 =
{
{e12, e20}, {e12, e21}, {e13, e17}, {e13, e21}, {e14, e20}, {e14, e21}, {e15, e20}, {e15, e21}
}
,
Cl14 =
{
{e1, e3, e16}, {e1, e11, e16}, {e2, e10, e16}
}
,
Cl15 =
{
{e3, e5, e17}, {e4, e10, e17}, {e5, e11, e17}
}
.
Then N(A ) = 15, which is considerably smaller than |A |.
However, [24] does not provide an algorithm for computing N(A ), making the bound practically not
useful except for very simple networks for which N(A ) can be readily evaluated. This issue will be
addressed in the next section after we have introduced the notion of equivalence-class domination in the
rest of this section.
The equivalence class containing a wiretap set A is denoted by Cl(A), or simply Cl if there is no
ambiguity. Note that the wiretap sets have possibly different cardinalities, and a wiretap set may be
separated from s by another wiretap set of a larger cardinality. If every wiretap set in an equivalence
class can be separated by some wiretap set with a larger cardinality, then it is not necessary to consider this
equivalence class for the purpose of lower bounding the required alphabet size. For instance in Example 1,
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since both the wiretap sets {e18} and {e19} are separated by another wiretap set {e1, e3, e16}, it is not
necessary to consider Cl5 =
{
{e18}, {e19}
}
. In the following, we explore the essence of this observation
and establish in Theorem 5 a strict partial order amongst the equivalence classes, which can help further
reduce the required alphabet size.
Definition 3 (Wiretap-Set Domination): Let A1 and A2 be two wiretap sets in A with |A1| < |A2|.
We say that A1 is dominated by A2, denoted by A1 ≺ A2, if there exists a minimum cut between s and
A2 that also separates A1 from s. In other words, upon deleting the edges in the minimum cut between
s and A2, s and A1 are also disconnected.
Note that in the above definition, in order for A1 ≺ A2, |A1| has to be strictly smaller than |A2|, and
A1 ≺ A2 does not mean that A2 is at the “upstream” of A1. For instance in Fig. 1, let A1 = {e3, e8}
and A2 = {e6, e10, e18}. We have A2 ≻ A1 since {e1, e2, e3} is a minimum cut between s and A2 that
separates A1 from s, although A1 is actually at the “upstream” of A2.
The following proposition gives a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a domination
relation between two wiretap sets.
Proposition 3: For wiretap sets A1 and A2 such that |A1| < |A2|, A1 ≺ A2 if and only if
mincut(s,A1 ∪A2) = mincut(s,A2). (2)
Proof: By Definition 3, the “only if” part is evident. We only need to prove the “if” part. Let CUT
be a minimum cut separating A1 ∪A2 from s, so that by (2),
|CUT| = mincut(s,A1 ∪A2) = mincut(s,A2),
which implies that CUT is also a minimum cut between s and A2. Since CUT is also a cut (not minimum
because |A1| < |A2|) between s and A1, we have A1 ≺ A2 by definition. This completes the proof.
We remark that although (1) for m = 2 is equivalent to (2), Proposition 2 and Proposition 3 are
different because in Proposition 2, A1, A2, · · · , Am have the same cardinality, while in Proposition 3 we
have |A1| < |A2|.
Next, we extend the notion of domination to equivalence classes.
Definition 4 (Equivalence-Class Domination): For two distinct equivalence classes Cl1 and Cl2, if
there exists a common minimum cut of the wiretap sets in Cl2 that separates all the wiretap sets in Cl1
from s, we say that Cl1 is dominated by Cl2, denoted by Cl1 ≺ Cl2.4
4Here we use the same symbol “≺” to represent two domination relations, but this abuse of notation should cause no ambiguity.
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We also give a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a domination relation between
two equivalence classes.
Theorem 4: Let A1 and A2 be two wiretap sets in A . Then Cl(A1) ≺ Cl(A2) if and only if A′1 ≺ A′2
for all A′1 ∈ Cl(A1) and A′2 ∈ Cl(A2).
Proof: See Appendix A.
For the equivalence-class domination relation, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 5: The equivalence-class domination relation “≺” amongst the equivalence classes in A
is a strict partial order.
In order to prove Theorem 5, we need the following lemma. Denote by MinCut(B) the set of the
minimum cuts between s and an edge set B.
Lemma 6: Let A1 and A2 be two wiretap sets and A1 ≺ A2. Then for any CUT1 ∈ MinCut(A1)
and any CUT1,2 ∈ MinCut(A1 ∪A2),
CUT1 ≺ CUT1,2.
Proof: See Appendix B.
An important consequence of Lemma 6 is the following theorem which enhances Theorem 4.
Theorem 7: Cl(A1) ≺ Cl(A2) if and only if A1 ≺ A2.
Proof: By Definition 4, the “only if” part is obvious. In the following we prove the “if” part. Let
CUTi be a common minimum cut of the wiretap sets in Cl(Ai), i = 1, 2. Let CUT1,2 ∈ MinCut(A1∪A2),
and so CUT1,2 ∼ A2 by Proposition 3.
Since A1 ≺ A2, by Lemma 6 we have CUT1 ≺ CUT1,2, i.e., there exists a minimum cut CUT
between s and CUT1,2 that separates CUT1 from s. By Proposition 3, we further obtain
mincut(s,CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2) = mincut(s,CUT1,2),
implying that CUT ∼ CUT1,2 ∼ A2. Together with A2 ∼ CUT2, we obtain CUT ∼ CUT2. Thus, CUT
and CUT2 have a common minimum cut, denoted by CUT∗, which satisfies the following:
1) CUT∗ is a common minimum cut between s and each of the wiretap sets in Cl(A2), since CUT∗
is a minimum cut between s and CUT2.
2) CUT∗ separates each of the wiretap sets in Cl(A1), since CUT∗ is a minimum cut between s and
CUT, and CUT separates CUT1 from s.
It then follows by definition that Cl(A1) ≺ Cl(A2), completing the proof.
With lemma 6 and Theorem 7, we are now ready to prove Theorem 5.
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Proof of Theorem 5: The irreflexivity can be easily proved by Definition 3 and Theorem 7 as
follows. Assume Cl ≺ Cl for some equivalence class Cl, which implies by Theorem 7 that A ≺ A for
any A ∈ Cl, a contradiction to the definition of wiretap-set domination (Definition 3).
To complete the proof, we only need to prove the transitivity of “≺”, i.e., for three equivalence classes
Cl1, Cl2, and Cl3, if Cl1 ≺ Cl2 and Cl2 ≺ Cl3, then Cl1 ≺ Cl3. Let Ai ∈ Cli, i = 1, 2, 3. By Theorem 7
and Proposition 3, it is sufficient to prove that
mincut(s,A1 ∪A3) = mincut(s,A3). (3)
First, note that a cut separating A1 ∪A3 from s is also a cut between s and A3, which implies
mincut(s,A1 ∪A3) ≥ mincut(s,A3). (4)
On the other hand, in light of Cl1 ≺ Cl2 and Cl2 ≺ Cl3, by Definition 4, there exists a common minimum
cut CUT′ of the wiretap sets in Cl2 which separates all the wiretap sets in Cl1 from s, and there exists
a common minimum cut CUT′′ of the wiretap sets in Cl3 which separates all the wiretap sets in Cl2.
Consequently, we have CUT′ ∈ MinCut(A2) and CUT′′ ∈ MinCut(A2∪A3). In addition, we also have
A2 ≺ A3 by Theorem 7 since Cl2 ≺ Cl3. Thus, it follows from Lemma 6 that
CUT′ ≺ CUT′′. (5)
Consider CUT′ ∪ CUT′′, and note that a cut between s and CUT′ ∪ CUT′′ separates A1 ∪ A2 ∪A3
from s. This implies
mincut(s,A1 ∪A3) ≤ mincut(s,A1 ∪A2 ∪A3) ≤ mincut(s,CUT
′ ∪ CUT′′). (6)
Together with (5) and Proposition 3, we further obtain that
mincut(s,CUT′ ∪CUT′′) = mincut(s,CUT′′). (7)
Since CUT′′ is a common minimum cut of the wiretap sets in Cl3, we have
mincut(s,CUT′′) = mincut(s,A3). (8)
By (6), (7), and (8), we obtain
mincut(s,A1 ∪A3) ≤ mincut(s,A3). (9)
Then (3) follows from (4) and (9). The theorem is proved.
Since the set of all the equivalence classes in A has been proved to be a strictly partially ordered set,
we can define its maximal equivalence classes as follows.
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Definition 5 (Maximal Equivalence Class5): For a collection of wiretap sets A , an equivalence class
Cl is a maximal equivalence class if there exists no other equivalence class Cl′ such that Cl′ ≻ Cl. Denote
by Nmax(A ) the number of the maximal equivalence classes in A .
Let Cl be a maximal equivalence class and Cl1, Cl2, · · · , Clm be m equivalence classes that are
dominated by Cl. By Definition 4, for each 1 ≤ i ≤ m, there exists a common minimum cut of the
wiretap sets in Cl, denoted by CUTi, that separates all the wiretap sets in Cli from s. For any wiretap
set A in Cl, since each CUTi is a common minimum cut of the wiretap sets in Cl, CUTi ∼ A. This
implies that all CUTi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, are equivalent by transitivity of the equivalence relation “∼”. Using
the argument immediately above Proposition 2, we see that CUTi, 1 ≤ i ≤ m, have a common minimum
cut, say CUT. Then a secure network code which is secure for CUT is also secure for all the wiretap sets
in every Cli, 1 ≤ i ≤ m. Therefore, the number of maximal equivalence classes in A gives a new lower
bound on the required alphabet size, which is potentially an improvement over the lower bound N(A ).
Theorem 8: Let (G,A ) be a wiretap network and F be the alphabet with |F| ≥ |T |, the number
of sink nodes in G. Then there exists an F-valued secure network code on (G,A ) provided that the
alphabet size |F| > Nmax(A ).
We continue to use the setup in Example 1 to illustrate the concepts mentioned above and the advantage
of the new bound.
Example 2: Recall the wiretap network (G,A ) in Example 1. With the equivalence-class domination
“≺”, the strict partial order of the equivalence classes is illustrated by the Hasse diagram in Fig. 2,
which shows that Cl11, Cl14, and Cl15 are all of the maximal equivalence classes, i.e., Nmax(A ) = 3,
which is much smaller than N(A ) = 15.
In general, computing the values of N(A ) and Nmax(A ), or characterizing the corresponding Hasse
diagram, is nontrivial. Even in the simple example, their values are not obvious. How to efficiently
compute N(A ) and Nmax(A ) will be discussed in the next section.
It is easily seen that Nmax(A ) ≤ N(A ) ≤ |A |, and in general Nmax(A ) can be much smaller than
|A | as illustrated by Example 3 below. The only case when Nmax(A ) has no improvement over |A |, i.e.,
Nmax(A ) = |A |, is that every wiretap set itself forms an equivalence class and no domination relation
exists amongst all the equivalence classes. In this case, the collection of wiretap sets A is “sparse” and
the value of |A | is already small.
5The maximal equivalence classes are those maximal elements in the set of equivalence classes, when this set is viewed as a
strictly partially ordered set.
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Cl12 Cl7 Cl13 Cl10 Cl8 Cl9 Cl11
Cl14 Cl15
Cl1 Cl2 Cl3 Cl4 Cl5 Cl6
Fig. 2. The Hasse diagram of the set of all 15 equivalence classes, ordered by the equivalence-class domination relation “≺”.
Example 3: Consider the combination network GN,k (see [14, p.26], [15, p.450]) with N = 20 and
k = 19. In this network, there is a single source node s, 20 intermediate nodes, and |T | =
(20
19
)
= 20 sink
nodes. Each intermediate node is connected to s, and each sink node is connected to a distinct subset
of 19 intermediate nodes. The number of the edges in the network is |E| = N + |T | · k = 400, and the
minimum cut capacity between s and every sink node is 19.
We partition all the edges into two layers: the upper and lower layers. The upper layer consists of
N = 20 edges connecting the source node s and the intermediate nodes. The lower layer consists of
|T | · k = 380 edges connecting the intermediate nodes and the sink nodes. Assume that a wiretapper
eavesdrops none of the edges in the upper layer and at most 17 edges in the lower layer, all of which
are from distinct intermediate nodes. Note that the number of outgoing edges of each intermediate node
is
(N−1
k−1
)
= 19. Then the total number of wiretap sets is
|A | =
17∑
i=1
(
20
i
)
19i ≫ 1917 ≈ 5.48 × 1021.
Next, we compute N(A ) and Nmax(A ). Note that two wiretap sets A1 and A2 with |A1| = |A2| are
equivalent if and only if
{tail(d) : d ∈ A1} = {tail(e) : e ∈ A2}.
Then both A1 and A2 are dominated by the edge subset {d′ = (s, tail(d)) : d ∈ A1}. In general, for
every wiretap set A in an equivalence class Cl, {tail(e) : e ∈ A} are identical, and all the wiretap
sets in Cl are dominated by the edge subset {e′ = (s, tail(e)) : e ∈ A}. Thus, there is a one-to-one
correspondence between an equivalence class and a subset of intermediate nodes, which has cardinality
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no more than 17. Then N(A ) =
∑17
i=1
(
20
i
)
≈ 1.05 × 106, which is much smaller than |A |.
Furthermore, an equivalence class Cl1 is dominated by another one Cl2 if and only if {tail(d) : d ∈
A1} ( {tail(e) : e ∈ A2}, where A1 and A2 are two arbitrary wiretap sets in Cl1 and Cl2, respectively.
In other words, Cl1 ≺ Cl2 if and only if the subset of intermediate nodes corresponding to Cl1 is strictly
contained by the subset of intermediate nodes corresponding to Cl2. Thus, Nmax(A ) =
(
20
17
)
= 1140,
which is in turn much smaller than N(A ).
In general, for a fixed k, the difference N(A ) − Nmax(A ) → ∞ as N → ∞. Therefore, the
improvement of Nmax(A ) over N(A ) is unbounded.
IV. EFFICIENT ALGORITHM FOR COMPUTING THE LOWER BOUND
In Section III, a new lower bound on the required alphabet size of the existence of secure network
codes over a wiretap network (G,A ) is obtained. This lower bound is graph-theoretical, and specifically
it depends on the topology of the network G and the collection A of wiretap sets. However, it is not
given in a form which is readily computable. In this section, we develop a polynomial-time algorithm to
compute this lower bound.
A. Primary Minimum Cut
Definition 6 (Primary Minimum Cut): Consider a finite directed acyclic network G = (V,E) with
a single source s, and let t be a non-source node in V . A minimum cut between s and t in G is primary,
if it separates s and all the minimum cuts between s and t. In other words, a primary minimum cut
between s and t is a common minimum cut of all the minimum cuts between s and t.
The notion of primary minimum cut is crucial to the development of our algorithm in the next
subsection. We will first prove the existence and uniqueness of the primary minimum cut between the
source node s and a non-source node t. In the following, we introduce the binary relation “≤” amongst
the minimum cuts between s and t.
Definition 7: Let CUT1 and CUT2 be two minimum cuts between s and t. We write CUT1 ≤ CUT2,
if CUT1 separates CUT2 from s, or equivalently, CUT1 is a cut between s and CUT2.
This binary relation “≤” between two minimum cuts is a non-strict partial order (Definition 2), as to
be proved in the following theorem. This further implies that for two distinct minimum cuts CUT1 and
CUT2 between s and t, CUT2  CUT1 provided that CUT1 ≤ CUT2.
Theorem 9: The binary relation “≤” amongst the minimum cuts between s and t is a non-strict
partial order.
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Proof: Denote by MinCut(t) the set of all minimum cuts between s and t, and let CUT1, CUT2,
and CUT3 be three minimum cuts in MinCut(t). Reflexivity is apparent. For antisymmetry, we assume
CUT1 ≤ CUT2 and CUT2 ≤ CUT1. By Definition 7, we obtain that CUT1 (resp. CUT2) separates
CUT2 (resp. CUT1) from s. This implies CUT1 = CUT2.
To prove transitivity, i.e., if CUT1 ≤ CUT2 and CUT2 ≤ CUT3, then CUT1 ≤ CUT3, we discuss
the following two cases:
Case 1. At least two out of the three minimum cuts are the same. Transitivity is immediate.
Case 2. The three minimum cuts are distinct. Then, CUT1 ≤ CUT2 and CUT2 ≤ CUT3 mean that
CUT1 separates CUT2 from s and CUT2 separates CUT3 from s, respectively. Consequently,
CUT1 separates CUT3 from s, which proves CUT1 ≤ CUT3 by Definition 7.
The theorem is proved.
The proof of the proposition below is straightforward and so it is omitted.
Proposition 10: Let n = mincut(s, t) and CUT be an arbitrary minimum cut between s and t. Then
an arbitrary set of n edge-disjoint paths from s to t contains all the n edges in CUT, and each of the
n edges is on an exactly one of the n edge-disjoint paths.
For an acyclic network G, there exists an upstream-to-downstream order (also called ancestral topo-
logical order) on the edges in E, which is consistent with the natural partial order of the edges. To be
specific, for two distinct edges d and e in E, if there is a directed path from d to e, we write d ≤ e.6
We also set e ≤ e, ∀e ∈ E. It is not difficult to see that the binary relation “≤” amongst the edges in E
is a non-strict partial order: the reflexivity and transitivity of “≤” are immediate, and the antisymmetry
follows from the acyclicity of G. The following lemma provides a necessary and sufficiency condition
for CUT1 ≤ CUT2, where CUT1 and CUT2 are two minimum cuts between s and t.
Lemma 11: Let CUT1,CUT2 ∈ MinCut(t), the set of all minimum cuts between s and t. Then
CUT1 ≤ CUT2 if and only if there exist n = mincut(s, t) edge-disjoint paths P1, P2, · · · , Pn from s to
t such that e1,i ≤ e2,i, where Pi ∩ CUT1 = {e1,i} and Pi ∩ CUT2 = {e2,i} for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Following Proposition 10 and Lemma 11, the next theorem asserts that the order between two minimum
cuts under the relation “≤” is independent of which set of n edge-disjoint paths from s to t is chosen.
The proofs of Lemma 11 and Theorem 12 are relegated to Appendix C.
Theorem 12: Let n = mincut(s, t) and CUT1,CUT2 ∈ MinCut(t) with CUT1 ≤ CUT2, and
P1, P2, · · · , Pn be n arbitrary edge-disjoint paths from s to t. Then e1,i ≤ e2,i holds for all i = 1, 2, · · · , n,
6Here we use the same symbol “≤” to represent two binary relations, but this abuse of notation should cause no ambiguity.
September 17, 2018 DRAFT
ALPHABET SIZE REDUCTION FOR SECURE NETWORK CODING: A GRAPH THEORETIC APPROACH 17
where Pi ∩CUT1 = {e1,i} and Pi ∩ CUT2 = {e2,i}, 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
We now proceed to prove the existence and uniqueness of the primary minimum cut in Definition 6.
1) Existence: Let CUT1 = {e1,i : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} and CUT2 = {e2,i : i = 1, 2, . . . , n} be two
minimum cuts in MinCut(t), and P1, P2, · · · , Pn be n arbitrary edge-disjoint paths from s to t,
where n = mincut(s, t). We assume without loss of generality that Pi ∩ CUT1 = {e1,i} and
Pi ∩ CUT2 = {e2,i} for 1 ≤ i ≤ n. Define an edge set
CUT = {ei = minord(e1,i, e2,i) : i = 1, 2, . . . , n},
where
minord(e1,i, e2,i) =


e1,i, if e1,i ≤ e2,i;
e2,i, otherwise.
It was proved in [24, Lemma 5] that the above edge set CUT is also a minimum cut between s and t.
By Lemma 11, we further have CUT ≤ CUT1 and CUT ≤ CUT2. Consequently, by Definition 7,
CUT is a common minimum cut of CUT1 and CUT2. Thus, we obtain CUT1 ∼ CUT2 by the
definition of the equivalence relation “∼”. Similarly, we can prove that all the minimum cuts in
MinCut(t) are equivalent. We also have |MinCut(t)| <∞ since the network G is finite. Thus, by
the argument immediately before Proposition 2, there exists a common minimum cut CUT∗ of all
minimum cuts in MinCut(t). In other words, CUT∗ is a primary minimum cut between s and t
by Definition 6.
2) Uniqueness: Let CUT∗1 and CUT∗2 be two primary minimum cuts between s and t. We obtain that
CUT∗1 ≤ CUT
∗
2 and CUT∗2 ≤ CUT∗1 by Definitions 6 and 7. This implies CUT∗1 = CUT∗2 by the
antisymmetry of “≤” in Theorem 9.
The concept of the primary minimum cut between the source node s and a non-source node t can be
extended to between s and a wiretap set A ∈ A in the same way that the concept of a cut between
s and t is extended to between s and A. In particular, for every wiretap set A ∈ A , there exists a
unique primary minimum cut between s and A, and further the minimum cut between s and the primary
minimum cut is unique, i.e., itself.
Based on the above discussions, we now prove the next theorem, which shows that the computation of
Nmax(A ) can be reduced to the computation of a set of primary minimum cuts such that each wiretap
set A ∈ A (A is assumed to be regular) is separated from s by at least one primary minimum cut in this
set. This theorem is the cornerstone in the development of our efficient algorithm to compute Nmax(A ).
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Theorem 13: Let A be a regular edge set in a finite directed acyclic network G with a single source
node s, and CUT be the primary minimum cut between s and A. Then, the following hold:
1) For any regular edge set A′ with A′ ∼ A, CUT is also the primary minimum cut between s and A′.
2) For any regular edge set B with B ≺ A, CUT separates B from s.
Proof: Let A′ be a regular edge set with A′ ∼ A and A′ 6= A, and CUT′ be the primary minimum
cut between s and A′. We now prove that CUT = CUT′ as follows. First we see that CUT ∼ A and
CUT′ ∼ A′. Together with A ∼ A′, CUT ∼ CUT′ follows from the transitivity of “∼”. Thus, CUT and
CUT′ have a common minimum cut, denoted by CUT∗. While CUT∗ separates CUT from s, CUT∗ is
also a minimum cut between s and A. Then it follows from Definition 7 that
CUT∗ ≤ CUT. (10)
On the other hand, since CUT is the primary minimum cut between s and A, and CUT∗ is a minimum
cut between s and A, we also have CUT ≤ CUT∗ by Definition 6. Combining this with (10), we obtain
CUT = CUT∗. Similarly, we can prove that CUT′ = CUT∗. Therefore, CUT = CUT′.
Next, we prove 2). Since B ≺ A, by Definition 3, there exists a minimum cut CUT′′ of A which
separates B from s. Furthermore, since CUT is the primary minimum cut between s and A, we can see
that CUT ≤ CUT′′ by Definitions 6 and 7. This implies that CUT separates B from s. The theorem is
proved.
Corollary 14: In a wiretap network (G,A ), let Cl be an arbitrary equivalence class of the wiretap
sets. Then
1) all the wiretap sets in Cl have the same primary minimum cut, which hence is called the primary
minimum cut of the equivalence class Cl, and
2) for every equivalence class Cl′ with Cl′ ≺ Cl, the primary minimum cut of Cl separates all the
wiretap sets in Cl′ from s.
The above corollary can be proved by a straightforward application of Theorem 13. Since two maximal
equivalence classes in (G,A ) cannot share a common primary minimum cut, this corollary shows that
in order to compute Nmax(A ) for a wiretap network (G,A ), it suffices to find the primary minimum
cuts of all the maximal equivalence classes in (G,A ).
B. Algorithm
Based on the observation at the end of the last subsection, we now develop an efficient algorithm
for computing Nmax(A ). In our algorithm, the primary minimum cuts of all the maximal equivalence
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classes in (G,A ) are obtained without first determining the equivalence classes of wiretap sets and the
domination relation among them. This is the key to the efficiency of the algorithm. To be specific, we
compute Nmax(A ) as follows:
1) Define a set B, and initialize B to the empty set.
2) Arbitrarily choose a wiretap set A ∈ A that has the largest cardinality in A . Find the primary
minimum cut between s and A, and call it CUT.
3) Partition the edge set E into two disjoint subsets: ECUT and EcCUT , E \ECUT, where ECUT is
the set of the edges reachable from the source node s upon deleting the edges in CUT. Note that
CUT ⊂ EcCUT.
4) Remove all the wiretap sets in A that are subsets of EcCUT and add the primary minimum cut
CUT to B.
5) Repeat Steps 2) to 4) until A is empty and output B, where Nmax(A ) = |B|.
The algorithm is explained as follows:
• In Step 2), since the algorithm always chooses a wiretap set A ∈ A that has the largest cardinality
in A , the chosen wiretap set A belongs to a maximal equivalence class.
• In Step 3), according to Corollary 14, the wiretap sets in the equivalence class Cl(A) or an
equivalence class Cl with Cl ≺ Cl(A) are subsets of EcCUT. Removing these wiretap sets from
A is equivalent to removing Cl(A) and all equivalence classes Cl with Cl ≺ Cl(A).
• In addition, for any other equivalence class Cl′ with Cl′ ⊀ Cl(A), by Theorem 7, we have A′ ⊀ A for
any wiretap set A′ ∈ Cl′. We now prove by contradiction that A′ ⊀ CUT. Assume that A′ ≺ CUT.
Then there exists a minimum cut CUT∗ of CUT that separates s from A′. Since CUT is the
primary minimum cut of A and CUT∗ is a minimum cut of CUT, we have CUT∗ = CUT and
CUT∗ separates s from A. Then CUT∗ is a (primary) minimum cut of A that separates s from A′,
implying that A′ ≺ A, which is a contradiction to A′ ⊀ A.
• As such, none of the wiretap sets in Cl′ ⊀ Cl(A) are removed from A , and in particular, all
maximal equivalence classes other than Cl(A) are not removed from A . Thus, exactly one maximal
equivalence class is removed from A in each iteration.
Remark 15: If in Step 4) we instead consider only those wiretap sets of the same cardinality as A,
which means that only the wiretap sets in Cl(A) are removed from A , then the algorithm at the end
outputs B with |B| = N(A ) instead of Nmax(A ).
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In the proposed algorithm, we assume that all the wiretap sets in A are regular. The algorithm can
be modified so that it continues to be applicable without this assumption. This can be done by replacing
“arbitrarily choose a wiretap set A ∈ A that has the largest cardinality in A ” in Step 2) by “arbitrarily
choose a wiretap set A ∈ A that has the largest minimum cut capacity in A ”. However, this would
require pre-computing the minimum cut capacity of every wiretap set in A (this is essentially the same
as replacing every non-regular wiretap set in A by one of its minimum cuts, which is regular). Although
the complexity for computing the minimum cut capacity of a wiretap set is only polynomial in |E|, this
will still significantly increase the computational complexity of the algorithm when |A | is large. To avoid
this shortcoming, we modify the original algorithm (which assumes that all the wiretap sets are regular)
by replacing Step 4) by:
4’) Remove all the wiretap or edge sets in A ∪ B that are subsets of EcCUT. Add the primary
minimum cut CUT to B.
An implementation of this algorithm can be found in Algorithm 1. Before we explain this algorithm, we
first generalize two definitions and prove a lemma.
Definition 8: Two wiretap sets are equivalent if they have a common minimum cut.
Definition 9: Let A′ and A be two wiretap sets in A . Then A′ is dominated by A (write A′ ≺ A) if
mincut(s,A′) < mincut(s,A) and there exists a minimum cut between s and A that separates A′ from s.
Definitions 8 and 9 are generalizations of their original versions that require the wiretap sets to be
regular.
Lemma 16: For two wiretap sets A1 and A2 (not necessarily regular) in A with mincut(s,A1) <
mincut(s,A2), A1 ≺ A2 if and only if CUTA1 ≺ CUTA2 , where CUTA1 and CUTA2 are the primary
minimum cuts of A1 and A2, respectively.
Proof: For the “if” part, since CUTA2 is the primary minimum cut of A2 and CUTA1 ≺ CUTA2 ,
CUTA2 separates CUTA1 from s. Together with CUTA1 being the (primary) minimum cut of A1,
CUTA2 separates A1 from s, implying A1 ≺ A2. For the “only if” part, since A1 ≺ A2, there exists a
minimum cut CUT∗A2 between s and A2 that separates A1 from s. This further implies that CUT
∗
A2 is
also a minimum cut between s and A1 ∪ A2. By Lemma 6, we have CUTA1 ≺ CUT∗A2 . In addition,
since CUTA2 is the primary minimum cut of A2, we obtain CUTA2 ≤ CUT∗A2 by Definitions 6 and 7.
Combining CUTA1 ≺ CUT∗A2 and CUTA2 ≤ CUT
∗
A2 , we have proved that CUTA1 ≺ CUTA2 .
We now explain Algorithm 1 as follows:
• In Step 4’), CUTA is added to B.
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Algorithm 1: Algorithm for Computing Nmax(A )
Input: The wiretap network (G,A ), where G = (V,E).
Output: Nmax(A ), the number of maximal equivalence classes with respect to (G,A ).
begin
1 Set B = ∅;
2 while A 6= ∅ do
3 choose a wiretap set A of the largest cardinality in A ;
4 find the primary minimum cut CUT of A;
5 partition E into two parts ECUT and EcCUT = E \ ECUT;
6 for each B ∈ A ∪B do
7 if B ⊆ EcCUT then
8 remove B from A .
end
end
9 add CUT to B.
end
10 Return B. // Note that |B| = Nmax(A ).
end
• If A has the largest minimum cut capacity in A , then CUTA will stay in B until the algorithm
terminates. This implies that A belongs to a maximal equivalent class. Otherwise, there must exist
a wiretap set A′ in A such that A′ ≻ A. By Definition 9, this implies that mincut(s,A′) >
mincut(s,A), contradicting the fact that A has the largest minimum cut capacity in A .
• If A does not have the largest minimum cut capacity in A ,
1) if A belongs to a maximal equivalence class (e.g. Cl11 in Example 2), then by Lemma 16,
CUTA will stay in B until the algorithm terminates;
2) otherwise (e.g. Cl12 in Example 2), by Lemma 16, CUTA will subsequently be replaced by
some primary minimum cut CUTA′′ of a wiretap set A′′ in A . Repeat this argument if necessary
until a primary minimum cut CUTA∗ is added to B, where Cl(A∗) is a maximal equivalence
class such that A∗ ≻ A.
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• Combining all the above, we see that at the end the algorithm outputs B that contains all the primary
minimum cuts of the maximal equivalence classes in A , and computes the minimum cut capacity
of a wiretap set for at most N(A ) times (instead of |A | times).
In Algorithm 1, two key steps, namely finding the primary minimum cut and the edge partition (Lines
4 and 5 in Algorithm 1, respectively), are involved. The edge partition can be implemented efficiently
by slightly modifying existing search algorithms on directed graphs [27], [28]. We can use a classical
search algorithm to find all the nodes reachable along directed paths from the source node s. To find
all the edges in ECUT, i.e., the edges reachable from s upon deleting the edges in CUT, it suffices to
add a simple functionality for storing the reachable edges during the search process. The implementation
is given in Algorithm 2. In [27], it is shown that the search algorithm runs in O(|E|) time because in
the worst case the algorithm needs to traverse all the edges in E. Here, since the primary minimum cut
CUT of the wiretap set A is removed from the network G, Algorithm 2 can find the edge set ECUT in
O(|ECUT|) time.
Before giving an efficient algorithm for finding the primary minimum cut, we first introduce some
notation below. Let G = (V,E) be a directed acyclic network with a single source node s and t be a sink
node in V \{s}. Denote by Ct the minimum cut capacity between the source node s and the sink node t.
By the max-flow min-cut theorem [25], [26], the value v(f) of a maximum flow f from s to t is equal
to the minimum cut capacity Ct between s and t, i.e., v(f) = Ct. Since all the edges in the network
G have unit-capacity (i.e., the capacity is 1), Ct is a positive integer and the maximum flow f can be
decomposed into Ct edge-disjoint paths from s to t. Various algorithms for finding such edge-disjoint
paths can be implemented in polynomial time in |E| [27], [28].
Now, we explore efficient algorithms for finding the primary minimum cut between s and an edge set.
For the convenience of presentation, we instead consider algorithms for finding the primary minimum
cut between s and a node t 6= s. Toward this end, we propose Algorithm 3 which takes as input a set of
Ct edge-disjoint paths from s to t. Such a set of paths can be obtained by using any existing algorithm
for this purpose. The verification of Algorithm 3 is given in Appendix D. We give an example below to
illustrate the algorithm.
Example 4: A directed acyclic network G with a maximum flow f from s to t is depicted in Fig. 3(a),
where s and t are the source node and the sink node, respectively. Fig. 3 illustrates Algorithm 3 that
outputs the primary minimum cut between s and t in G:
• At first, only the pair of nodes (s, i3) satisfies Line 3 in Algorithm 3, i.e., ∃ a forward edge from s
to i3 with the flow value 0. Update S to {s, i3}. Next, for i3, (i3, i7) and (i3, i9) are two pairs of
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Algorithm 2: Search Algorithm
begin
1 Unmark all nodes in V ;
2 mark source node s;
3 pred(s) := 0; // pred(i) refers to a predecessor node of node i.
4 set the edge-set SET = ∅;
5 set the node-set LIST = {s};
6 while LIST 6= ∅ do
7 select a node i in LIST;
8 if node i is incident to an edge (i, j) such that node j is unmarked then
9 mark node j;
10 pred(j) := i;
11 add node j to LIST;
12 add all parallel edges leading from i to j to SET;
else
13 delete node i from LIST;
end
end
14 Return the edge-set SET.
end
nodes such that there exist two forward edges with the flow value 0 from i3 to i7 and i9, respectively.
Update S to {s, i3, i7, i9}. This is illustrated in Fig. 3(b).
• For i7 ∈ S, the edge (i7, i10) is the only edge connecting i7 with another node in V \ S. It is a
forward edge but with the flow value 1 and does not satisfy Line 3 in Algorithm 3. For i9, since
i9 ∈ S, i6 /∈ S and (i9, i6) is a reverse edge with the flow value 1, update S to {s, i3, i6, i7, i9}.
Similarly, we further update S to {s, i2, i3, i5, i6, i7, i9} by considering i6 ∈ S. This is illustrated in
Fig. 3(c).
• Finally, since (i5, i1) is a reverse edge with the flow value 1, we obtain S = {s, i1, i2, i3, i5, i6, i7, i9},
as illustrated in Fig. 3(d).
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Algorithm 3: Algorithm for Finding the Primary Minimum Cut
Input: An acyclic network G = (V,E) with a maximal flow f from the source node s to a sink
node t, i.e., for every edge e in the corresponding Ct edge-disjoint paths, the flow value is
defined as 1, written as f(e) = 1; otherwise, the flow value is defined as 0, written as
f(e) = 0.
Output: The primary minimum cut between s and t.
begin
1 Set S = {s};
2 for each node i ∈ S do
3 if ∃ a node j ∈ V \ S s.t. either ∃ a forward edge e from i to j s.t. f(e) = 0 or ∃ a reverse
edge e from j to i s.t. f(e) = 1 then
4 replace S by S ∪ {j}.
end
end
5 Return CUT = {e : tail(e) ∈ S and head(e) ∈ V \ S}.
end
Then the output edge set that is the primary minimum cut between s and t on G is
CUT = {e : tail(e) ∈ S and head(e) ∈ V \ S} = {(i5, t), (i9, t), (i7, i10), (s, i4)}.
In fact, Algorithm 3 can be regarded as the last part of the augmenting path algorithm [25], [26] (also
see [27, Chapter 6.5] and [28, Chapter 7.2]) for determining the termination of the algorithm, i.e., the flow
value cannot be further increased. Algorithm 3 requires at most O(|E|) time since the search method
examines each edge at most once. If we use the augmenting path algorithm to find Ct edge-disjoint
paths from s to t, then Algorithm 3 is already incorporated, and the total computational complexity for
finding the primary minimum cut between s and t is at most O(Ct · |E|) since the path augmentation
approach requires at most O(|E|) time and the number of the path augmentations is upper bounded
by the minimum cut capacity Ct. This total computational complexity may be reduced by employing
more efficient maximum-flow algorithms for finding Ct edge-disjoint paths from s to t. For instance, if
we suitably combine the features of the augmenting path algorithms and the shortest augmenting path
algorithms [29], [30], the total computational complexity is O(min{C2/3t |E|, |E|3/2}), which is better
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(a) Initialize S to {s}.
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(b) Update S to {s, i3, i7, i9}.
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(c) Update S to {s, i2, i3, i5, i6, i7, i9}.
s
i1
i2 i3 i4
i6
i5
i7 i8
i9 i10 i11
t
1
1 0 1
10
1 1 0
0
1
0
1
0
1 1 0 1
1 1 1
(d) Update S to {s, i1, i2, i3, i5, i6, i7, i9}.
Fig. 3. An example to use Algorithm 3 for finding the primary minimum cut between s and t on the network G.
than O(Ct · |E|).
Next, we continue to use the setup in Examples 1 and 2 to illustrate Algorithm 1 for computing
Nmax(A ).
Example 5: Recall the wiretap network (G,A ) in Examples 1 and 2. Define a set B and initialize
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B to the empty set.
Step 1: Arbitrarily choose a wiretap set A1 in A of the largest cardinality 3, for instance, A1 =
{e1, e11, e16}. Find CUTA1 = {e1, e2, e3}, the primary minimum cut between s and A1, by
Algorithm 3. By Algorithm 2, we obtain the edge set
EcCUTA1 =
{
e1, e2, e3, e6, e7, e8, e9, e10, e11, e16, e18, e19
}
.
Remove the wiretap sets from A that are subsets of EcCUTA1 , e.g., {e6}, {e8, e18}, {e1, e11, e16},
etc. Update A to
{
{e12}, {e13}, {e14}, {e15}, {e20}, {e21}, {e10, e14}, {e10, e15}, {e10, e21},
{e11, e14}, {e11, e15}, {e11, e20}, {e12, e20}, {e12, e21}, {e13, e17}, {e13, e21},
{e14, e20}, {e14, e21}, {e15, e20}, {e15, e21}, {e18, e20}, {e18, e21}, {e19, e20},
{e19, e21}, {e3, e5, e17}, {e4, e10, e17}, {e5, e11, e17}
}
.
We remark that every wiretap set in the updated A has at least one edge not in EcCUTA1 . Add
CUTA1 to B so that B becomes {CUTA1};
Step 2: Arbitrarily choose a wiretap set A2 in the updated A of the largest cardinality 3, say A2 =
{e4, e10, e17}, and then find its primary minimum cut CUTA2 = {e3, e4, e5} by Algorithm 3.
Then use Algorithm 2 to obtain the edge set
EcCUTA2 =
{
e3, e4, e5, e10, e11, e12, e13, e14, e15, e17, e20, e21
}
,
and remove the wiretap sets from A that are subsets of EcCUTA2 . Update A to{
{e18, e20}, {e18, e21}, {e19, e20}, {e19, e21}
}
,
and add CUTA2 to B so that B becomes {CUTA1 ,CUTA2};
Step 3: Arbitrarily choose a wiretap set A3 = {e19, e20} in the updated A of the largest cardinality
2 and find its primary minimum cut CUTA3 = {e16, e17}. All the wiretap sets in A are subsets
of EcCUTA3 = {e16, e17, e18, e19, e20, e21}. Then update A to the empty set and add CUTA3 to
B so that B becomes {CUTA1 ,CUTA2 ,CUTA3}.
Algorithm 1 terminates and outputs B. Then we have Nmax(A ) = |B| = 3.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we have proved a new lower bound on the required alphabet size for the existence of
secure network codes. Our lower bound depends only on the network topology and the collection of
the wiretap sets. Our result shows that in general the required alphabet size can be reduced significantly
without sacrificing security and information rate. Since our bound is not in closed form, we also have
proposed a polynomial-time algorithm to compute it efficiently.
Toward developing our lower bound and the efficient algorithm for computing this bound, we have
introduced/discussed various graph-theoretic concepts, including the equivalence relation between two
edge sets (first appeared in [24]), the domination relation among equivalence classes of edge sets, the
primary minimum cut between the source node and a sink node, etc. Although in this paper these concepts
are applied solely in the context of secure network coding, they appear to be of fundamental interest in
graph theory and we expect that they will find applications in graph theory and beyond.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF THEOREM 4
First assume Cl(A1) ≺ Cl(A2). By Definition 4, there exists a common minimum cut CUT of the
wiretap sets in Cl(A2) that also separates each of the wiretap sets in Cl(A1) from s. For any A′1 ∈ Cl(A1)
and A′2 ∈ Cl(A2), we have
|A2| = mincut(s,A
′
2) ≤ mincut(s,A
′
1 ∪A
′
2) ≤ |CUT| = |A2|,
where the first and the last equalities follows from A2 ∼ A′2 and A2 ∼ CUT, respectively. Together with
Proposition 3, this proves the “only if” part.
We next prove the “if” part. Assume that A′1 ≺ A′2 for any A′1 ∈ Cl(A1) and A′2 ∈ Cl(A2). For any
A′1 ∈ Cl(A1), since a minimum cut between s and A′1 ∪ A2 is a cut between s and A2, together with
the condition A′1 ≺ A2 and Proposition 3, it follows that
mincut(s,A2) = mincut(s,A
′
1 ∪A2), (11)
i.e., a minimum cut between s and A′1 ∪ A2 is actually a minimum cut between s and A2. Define
MinCut(A′1∪A2) as the set of all the minimum cuts between s and A′1∪A2. Then for any A′1 ∈ Cl(A1),
by (11) we have A2 ∼ B for every minimum cut B ∈ MinCut(A′1∪A2). With a slight abuse of notation,
denote this by MinCut(A′1 ∪A2) ∼ A2.
September 17, 2018 DRAFT
ALPHABET SIZE REDUCTION FOR SECURE NETWORK CODING: A GRAPH THEORETIC APPROACH 28
Let CUT be a common minimum cut of the wiretap sets in Cl(A2). It follows that CUT ∼ A2 ∼
MinCut(A′1∪A2) for every A′1 ∈ Cl(A1). Now, for each A′1 ∈ Cl(A1), choose CUTA′1 ∈ MinCut(A
′
1∪
A2) arbitrarily. Then CUT ∼ CUTA′
1
for every A′1 ∈ Cl(A1). By Proposition 2, we obtain
mincut
(
s,CUT ∪
⋃
A′
1
∈Cl(A1)
CUTA′
1
)
= mincut(s,CUT) = |A2|,
which implies that there exists a common minimum cut CUT∗ of cardinality equal to |A2| separating
CUT and CUTA′
1
for every A′1 ∈ Cl(A1). Therefore, CUT∗ is a common minimum cut of the wiretap
sets in Cl(A2) which also separates each of the wiretap sets in Cl(A1), i.e., Cl(A1) ≺ Cl(A2) by
Definition 4. Theorem 4 is proved.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 6
Let |A1| = r1, |A2| = r2 and clearly r1 < r2 since A1 ≺ A2. Since A1 is regular and CUT1 ∈
MinCut(A1), it follows that
|CUT1| = mincut(s,A1) = |A1| = r1. (12)
Further since A1 ≺ A2 and CUT1,2 ∈ MinCut(A1 ∪A2), by Proposition 3 we have
|CUT1,2| = mincut(s,A1 ∪A2) = mincut(s,A2) = |A2| = r2. (13)
To prove CUT1 ≺ CUT1,2, by Proposition 3, it suffices to prove that
mincut(s,CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2) = mincut(s,CUT1,2) = r2.
First note that
mincut(s,CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2) ≥ mincut(s,A1 ∪A2) = r2, (14)
where the inequality follows from the fact that a cut between s and CUT1 ∪CUT1,2 separates A1 ∪A2
from s. Hence, we only need to prove that mincut(s,CUT1 ∪CUT1,2) ≤ r2.
Let mincut(s,CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2) = r. Then there exist r edge-disjoint paths from s to the edges in
CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2, say P1, P2, · · · , Pr , such that each path passes through exactly one edge in CUT1 ∪
CUT1,2 as the last edge of the path. This is explained as follows. Since the r last edges of the r paths are
included in CUT1∪CUT1,2, if one path of them passes through more than one edge in CUT1∪CUT1,2,
we can replace the path by its subpath from s to the first edge on the path in CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2, and
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this new path is still edge-disjoint with the other r − 1 paths and it passes through exactly one edge in
CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2, i.e., the last edge of the new path.
Let a (a ≤ r1 by (12)) be the number of paths among the r edge-disjoint paths P1, P2, · · · , Pr such that
their last edges are in CUT1\CUT1,2. Then for the remaining r−a paths, the r−a last edges of them are
in CUT1,2. Without loss of generality, assume the former a paths be P1, P2, · · · , Pa with the last edges
being e1, e2, · · · , ea ∈ CUT1 \ CUT1,2, respectively, and the latter r − a paths be Pa+1, Pa+2, · · · , Pr
with the last edges being ea+1, ea+2, · · · , er ∈ CUT1,2, respectively. Let
In(CUT1) = {e1, e2, · · · , ea} ⊆ CUT1 \ CUT1,2,
In(CUT1,2) = {ea+1, ea+2, · · · , er} ⊆ CUT1,2,
and
In(CUT1,2) = CUT1,2 \ In(CUT1,2).
Then
|In(CUT1)|+ |In(CUT1,2)| = r. (15)
Since CUT1 is a minimum cut between s and the wiretap set A1, i.e., |CUT1| = mincut(s,A1) = |A1|,
there are r1 edge-disjoint paths from CUT1 to A1 that start with all the r1 distinct edges in CUT1 and
end with all the r1 distinct edges in A1. Denote such r1 paths by P ′1, P ′2, · · · , P ′r1 and without loss of
generality assume that P ′1, P ′2, · · · , P ′a start with e1, e2, · · · , ea, respectively. Note that Pi ∩ P ′i = {ei}
for all 1 ≤ i ≤ a, since the network G is acyclic. Next, we prove by contradiction that
P ′i ∩CUT1,2 6= ∅, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ a. (16)
Assume P ′i ∩ CUT1,2 = ∅ for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ a. Since the path Pi from s to ei does not contain any
edge in (CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2) \ {ei}, Pi ∪ P ′i constitutes a path from s to some edge in A1 not including
any edge in CUT1,2, which contradicts to the assumption that CUT1,2 separates A1 from s. Hence, we
have proved (16).
We further prove by contradiction that
P ′i ∩ In(CUT1,2) 6= ∅, ∀ 1 ≤ i ≤ a. (17)
Suppose P ′i ∩ In(CUT1,2) = ∅ for some i, 1 ≤ i ≤ a. Note that P ′i does not pass through any edge in
CUT1\{ei}. Together with (16), P ′i must pass through an edge in In(CUT1,2) \ CUT1. Consider the
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last edge in In(CUT1,2) \CUT1 that P ′i pass through. Without loss of generality, let this edge be ea+1.
Then
ea+1 /∈ CUT1. (18)
Thus, the subpath of P ′i from ea+1 to some edge in A1 does not contain any edge in (CUT1∪CUT1,2)\
{ea+1}. Recall from the foregoing that the path Pa+1 does not contain any edge in (CUT1 ∪CUT1,2) \
{ea+1}. Then together with (18), we see that concatenating Pa+1 and the subpath of P ′i from ea+1 to some
edge in A1 yields a path from s to some edge in A1 without passing through any edge in CUT1. This
contradicts the assumption that CUT1 is a minimum cut between s and A1. Hence, we have proved (17).
Now, P ′i , 1 ≤ i ≤ a, are edge-disjoint. Together with (17), we have |In(CUT1,2)| ≥ a, or equivalently,
|In(CUT1,2)| ≤ r2 − a. It then follows from |In(CUT1)| = a and (15) that
r = |In(CUT1)|+ |In(CUT1,2)| ≤ a+ r2 − a = r2,
that is, mincut(s,CUT1 ∪ CUT1,2) ≤ r2. Lemma 6 is proved.
APPENDIX C
PROOFS OF LEMMA 11 AND THEOREM 12
Proof of Lemma 11: The “only if” part of the lemma is trivial.
We now prove the “if” part. Let CUT1 = {e1,i : i = 1, . . . , n} and CUT2 = {e2,i : i = 1, . . . , n} be
two minimum cuts in MinCut(t). Let P1, P2, · · · , Pn be n edge-disjoint paths from s to t such that for
each i, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, Pi∩CUT1 = {e1,i}, Pi∩CUT2 = {e2,i}, and e1,i ≤ e2,i. We now prove the “if” part
by contradiction. Assume the contrary that CUT1 ≤ CUT2 is false, i.e., CUT1 is not a cut separating
CUT2 from s. Upon deleting the edges in CUT1, there still exists a path, say P , from s to an edge in
CUT2, say e2,1 (P includes e2,1). Note that the path P and the subpath of P1 from head(e2,1) to t are
edge-disjoint since the network is acyclic. In addition, the subpath of P1 from head(e2,1) to t does not
contain the edges in CUT1 since P1 ∩CUT1 = {e1,1} and e1,1 ≤ e2,1. Hence, concatenating P and the
subpath of P1 from head(e2,1) to t yields a new path from s to t that contains no edges in CUT1, which
contradicts the assumption that CUT1 ∈ MinCut(t). The proof is completed.
Proof of Theorem 12: We will prove the theorem by contradiction. Suppose that there exist n edge-
disjoint paths from s to t, denoted by P1, P2, · · · , Pn, such that one of them, say P1, passes through an
edge e1,1 ∈ CUT1 and an edge e2,1 ∈ CUT2 (i.e., P1 ∩CUT1 = {e1,1} and P1 ∩CUT2 = {e2,1}) with
e2,1 < e1,1 (i.e., e2,1 ≤ e1,1 and e2,1 6= e1,1). Now, we divide the path P1 into two disjoint subpaths: the
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subpath from s to e2,1 (including e2,1), and the subpath from head(e2,1) to t passing through e1,1. By
Proposition 10, the first subpath of P1 from s to e2,1 contains no edges in (CUT1 ∪CUT2) \ {e2,1}. In
other words, there exists a path from s to an edge in CUT2 (i.e., e2,1) upon deleting all the edges in
CUT1, a contradiction to CUT1 ≤ CUT2. The theorem is proved.
APPENDIX D
VERIFICATION OF ALGORITHM 3
In this appendix, we verify that the output edge set CUT of Algorithm 3 is the primary minimum cut
between s and t. We adopt the standard terminologies in network flow theory. In a network G with a
flow f , a non-source node u is called reachable from s if there exists an f -unsaturated path from s to
u, where an f -unsaturated path means that each edge e on this path is either a forward edge with flow
value 0 or a reverse edge with flow value 1. For a detailed discussion on unsaturated path, we refer the
reader to [28, Chapter 7]. The following lemma is also standard.
Lemma D.1: In a network G with a flow f from the source node s to a sink node t, if there exists
an f -unsaturated path from s to t, then by “flipping” this path, i.e., replacing the flow value 0 of the
forward edges on the path by 1 and the flow value 1 of the reverse edges on the path by 0, a new flow
f ′ is obtained and the flow value of f ′ is increased by 1, i.e., v(f ′) = v(f) + 1. In particular, if no
unsaturated paths from s to t exist, the flow is a maximum flow from s to t.
Let CUT = {ei : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be the output edge set of Algorithm 3. Then the nodes tail(ei),
1 ≤ i ≤ n are reachable and the nodes head(ei), 1 ≤ i ≤ n are unreachable from s. This further implies
that all the edges in CUT have flow value 1, i.e., f(ei) = 1, 1 ≤ i ≤ n, because otherwise head(ei)
would be included in the set S when the algorithm terminates.
First, we can easily see that CUT is indeed a cut between s and t, i.e., t /∈ S, because otherwise
there exists an unsaturated path from s and t, implying that f is not a maximum flow by Lemma D.1.
It follows that n ≥ Ct ≥ 1.
We now prove that CUT is minimum, i.e., n = Ct. Assume the contrary that n > Ct. Then the
maximum flow f can be decomposed into Ct edge-disjoint paths P1, P2, · · · , PCt from s to t with
f(e) =


1, e ∈ Pi for some 1 ≤ i ≤ Ct;
0, otherwise.
(19)
Since f(ei) = 1 for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, each ei must be on one of the Ct edge-disjoint paths from s to t.
Furthermore, since n > Ct, there exists a path Pj that contains at least 2 edges in CUT, say e1 and
e2. We assume without loss of generality that e1 ≤ e2 on Pj . Note that tail(e2) is reachable from s. If
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tail(e2) = head(e1), then head(e1) is reachable from s, which is a contradiction because e1 ∈ CUT.
Otherwise, let eˆ be the predecessor of e2 on Pj . Since f(eˆ) = 1, tail(eˆ) is also reachable from s (through
tail(e2)). By repeating this argument if necessary, we see inductively that head(e1) is reachable from s,
a contradiction. Therefore, CUT must be a minimum cut between s and t, i.e., n = Ct = v(f).
It remains to prove that CUT is primary. Assume that CUT is not primary, and instead let CUT∗ =
{e∗i : 1 ≤ i ≤ n} be the primary minimum cut between s and t. By Definitions 6 and 7, we have
CUT∗ ≤ CUT. By Proposition 10, we can let CUT∩Pi = {ei} and CUT∗ ∩Pi = {e∗i } for 1 ≤ i ≤ n.
Then e∗i ≤ ei for all 1 ≤ i ≤ n by Theorem 12, which implies that for each 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the subpath
of Pi from head(ei) to t contains no edges in CUT∗. Since we assume that CUT 6= CUT∗, there
exists 1 ≤ i ≤ n such that ei 6= e∗i . Without loss of generality assume that e1 6= e∗1, and let P be an
f -unsaturated path from s to tail(e1).
Now, consider any edge e ∈ P ∩ P1. Since e ∈ P1, we have f(e) = 1, which together with e ∈ P
implies that e must be a reverse edge on P . Thus, we have proved the following claim which will be
used throughout the rest of the proof.
Claim 1: For every edge e ∈ P ∩ P1, head(e) is the node on P immediately before tail(e).
We now prove by contradiction that P and the subpath of P1 from tail(e1) to t, denoted by P tail(e1)→t1 ,7
are edge-disjoint. Let e ∈ P ∩ P tail(e1)→t1 . We consider two cases:
e = e1 By Claim 1, we can see that tail(e1) is reachable from s on P through head(e1), which implies
that head(e1) is also reachable from s, a contradiction.
e 6= e1 Since e ∈ P ∩P head(e1)→t1 , tail(e) is reachable from s (through head(e)) since e is on P . Together
with the flow value of each edge (if exists) on the subpath P head(e1)→tail(e)1 being 1, by the argument
previously used in proving that CUT is minimum, head(e1) is also reachable from s, which again is a
contradiction.
We now prove by contradiction that CUT∗ is not the primary minimum cut between s and t by
considering two cases.
Case 1: P ∩ P s→tail(e1)1 = ∅.
7Let P be an (unsaturated) path from s to a non-source node u. For any two nodes u1 preceding u2 on P , the subpath of P
from u1 to u2 is denoted by Pu1→u2 throughout this proof to simplify notation.
September 17, 2018 DRAFT
ALPHABET SIZE REDUCTION FOR SECURE NETWORK CODING: A GRAPH THEORETIC APPROACH 33
We will prove that in this case a new maximum flow f ′′ with f ′′(e∗1) = 0 can be found, i.e., the n
edge-disjoint paths from s to t with respect to f ′′ does not pass through e∗1. First, we define f ′ as
f ′(e) =


0, e ∈ P1;
f(e), otherwise;
which is a flow but no longer a maximum flow since v(f ′) = v(f)− 1 = n− 1. Then we can obtain an
f ′-unsaturated path Pˆ1 from s to t by concatenating P and P tail(e1)→t1 . Since e∗1 < e1 on P1, e∗1 is on
the subpath P s→tail(e1)1 . Together with P ∩ P
s→tail(e1)
1 = ∅, we have e∗1 /∈ Pˆ1. Now, define a flow f ′′ by
flipping the flow values in the f ′-unsaturated path Pˆ1, i.e.,
f ′′(e) =


1, e ∈ Pˆ1 with f ′(e) = 0;
0, e ∈ Pˆ1 with f ′(e) = 1;
f ′(e), otherwise.
(20)
By Lemma D.1, we have v(f ′′) = v(f ′) + 1 = n. We then have obtained a maximum flow f ′′ with
f ′′(e∗1) = 0. By Proposition 10, CUT∗ is not a minimum cut between s and t, and hence not the (primary)
minimum cut between s and t.
Case 2: P ∩ P s→tail(e1)1 6= ∅.
Let e′ be the first edge on P that is also on P1. We consider two cases.
Case 2A: e∗1 ≤ e′.
By Claim 1, e′ is a reverse edge on P with f(e′) = 1 and e′ < e1. Then the f -unsaturated subpath
P s→head(e
′) does not pass through tail(e′), and hence does not contain e′. On the other hand, since e′ is the
first edge on P that is also on P1, P s→head(e
′) does not contain any edge on P1. Thus, P s→head(e
′) is edge-
disjoint with P1, and therefore also with the subpath P s→head(e
′)
1 . Since e∗1 ≤ e′, e∗1 is on P
s→head(e′)
1
and hence not on P s→head(e′) and P head(e
′)→t
1 . By considering the concatenation of P s→head(e
′) and
P
head(e′)→t
1 , we see by using the same argument as in Case 1 that CUT∗ is not the primary minimum
cut between s and t.
Case 2B: e∗1 > e′.
Let e˜ be the last edge on P ∩ P1 such that e˜ < e∗1. Consider the following two cases:
1) P tail(e˜)→tail(e1) ∩ P tail(e˜)→tail(e1)1 = ∅. Since e˜ < e∗1 < e1, e∗1 ∈ P tail(e˜)→tail(e1)1 and hence
P tail(e˜)→tail(e1) does not contain e∗1. On the other hand, since e˜ is the last edge on P ∩P1 such that
e˜ < e∗1, P
tail(e˜)→tail(e1) contains no edges on P1, where we note that e˜ is not on P tail(e˜)→tail(e1)
by Claim 1. Then P tail(e˜)→tail(e1) is edge-disjoint with P1. By considering the concatenation of
P
s→tail(e˜)
1 , P
tail(e˜)→tail(e1)
, and P tail(e1)→t1 , we see by using the same argument as in Case 1 that
CUT∗ is not the primary minimum cut between s and t.
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2) P tail(e˜)→tail(e1) ∩P tail(e˜)→tail(e1)1 6= ∅. Let eˆ be the first edge on P ∩P1 such that eˆ ≥ e∗1. Together
with e˜ being the last edge on P ∩ P1 such that e˜ < e∗1, the subpath P tail(e˜)→head(eˆ) contains no
edges on P1 by Claim 1, and hence P tail(e˜)→head(eˆ) is edge-disjoint with P1. On the other hand,
we note that e˜ < e∗1 ≤ eˆ < e1 on P1, implying that e∗1 ∈ P
tail(e˜)→head(eˆ)
1 . Thus, considering the
concatenation of P s→tail(e˜)1 , P tail(e˜)→head(eˆ), and P
head(eˆ)→t
1 , we see by using the same argument
as in Case 1 that CUT∗ is not the primary minimum cut between s and t.
Combining all the above, Algorithm 3 is verified.
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